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I. INTRODUCTION

Gregg v. Georgia reinstated capital punishment with the understanding
that states had rewritten their statutes to ensure that capital punishment
would no longer be applied on an arbitrary or discriminatory basis.'
Unfortunately, history demonstrates that the legislatures have not upheld
their promises.2 In North Carolina, minorities currently make up nearly
sixty percent of death row inmates, but the minority population of the state
is only twenty-seven percent.3 In an attempt to correct the racial injustice
in North Carolina, the state legislature passed in 2009, and later amended in
2012, a statute called the Racial Justice Act to permit courts to commute
death sentences that were sought or imposed on the basis of racial
discrimination.4 Though the purpose of the 2009 Racial Justice Act and the
2012 Amendment may facially appear to be the same, the content of the
statute plays a critical role in determining whether it seeks to dispel explicit
or implicit bias; this in turn has an effect on whether a defendant will be
granted relief.'
Part II of this Comment explores the problems caused by explicit and
implicit bias in the jury selection of capital trials and examines what the
law has implemented as procedural safeguards to counteract different kinds
of racial bias. 6 Part III applies both the 2009 Racial Justice Act and the
2012 Amendment to State v. Golphin7 to argue that relief from implicit bias
will only be granted under the 2009 Racial Justice Act.8 Part IV reviews
1. See 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (noting that although the constitutionality of the
death penalty is derived from public opinion of evolving standards of decency, it
remains the Court's responsibility to protect the dignity of man from cruel and unusual
punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment).
2. See EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE UNITED STATES 1
(2011) (finding that eighty percent of executions since 1977 have been carried out by
southern states; eighty percent of all executions involved a white victim while whites
are only the victims of fifty percent of crime nationwide).
3. See NAACP, DEATH Row USA, WINTER 2012, at 37 (reporting eighty-five
Blacks, four Latinos, nine Native Americans, and one Asian on North Carolina's death
row).
4. See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-2010 (West 2011) ("No person shall be
subject to or given a sentence of death or shall be executed pursuant to any judgment
that was sought or obtained on the basis of race.").
5. Compare id (granting relief based on disparate impact showings of implicit
bias), with Act of July 2, 2012, 2012 N.C. Sess. Laws 136, sec. 3, § 15A-2011(a)
(2012) (granting relief based on an explicit showing of discrimination).
6. See infra Part 11(comparing the remedies offered by Batson v. Kentucky, 476
U.S. 79 (1986); the 2009 Racial Justice Act; and the 2012 Amendment).
7. State v. Golphin (Golphin 1), 533 S.E.2d 168 (N.C. 2000); see also Golphin v.
Branker (Golphin II), 519 F.3d 168 (4th Cir. 2008) (denying petition for writ of habeas
corpus).
8. See infra Part Ill (arguing that if the 2012 Amendment is construed narrowly so
as to constrain the use of statistical evidence and require proof of intentional
discrimination, then it will have the effect of allowing for implicit racial bias to
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the recent decision on Golphin's Motion for Appropriate Relief by the
Cumberland County, North Carolina, Superior Court, which addressed the
2012 Amendment as a matter of first impression. 9 Part V advocates for the
reinstatement of the 2009 Racial Justice Act, since the 2012 Amendment
will allow implicit bias to pervade the jury selection process. 10 Finally,
Part VI concludes that Golphin proves that relief from implicit racial bias
can only be granted using the 2009 Racial Justice Act."
II.

BACKGROUND

A. The Supreme Court's Racial Bias JurisprudenceReflects a Focus on
Addressing Explicit Bias in the Courtroom.

Until the passage of the 2009 Racial Justice Act, American courts have
concentrated on implementing legal standards that only address the concept
of explicit racial bias.12 Explicit racial bias occurs when individuals
demonstrate intentional acts of racial discrimination.' 3 The Supreme Court
addressed one mechanism of explicit bias in examining prosecutorial
peremptory strikes in Batson v. Kentucky.14 In Batson, the Court reasoned
that a prosecutor's peremptory strikes are invalid if they are based on the
juror's race or the assumption that a juror of one race cannot adequately

continue in jury selection).
9. While this Comment was in publication, Judge Gregory Weeks handed down a
decision on Golphin's Motion for Appropriate Relief. See North Carolina v. Golphin
(Golphin III), No. 97 CRS 47314-15 (N.C. Super. Ct. Dec. 13, 2012). Though Judge
Weeks's holding reflects a liberal interpretation of the 2012 Amendment to the Racial
Justice Act, his interpretation of the statute could be struck down later in the appeals
process. Therefore, this Comment proceeds by analyzing the 2012 Amendment as if a
narrow interpretation has already been adopted. This magnifies the significant impact a
reviewing court could have if it decided to overturn Judge Weeks's current
interpretation. In either case, this Comment argues that the provisions found in the
2009 Racial Justice Act are the most effective in combatting implicit racial bias stand.
See infra Part IV.
10. See infra Part V (insisting that the 2009 Racial Justice Act was the most
successful rule of law thus far in tempering the effects of implicit bias).
11. See infra Part VI (concluding that the 2012 Amendment is unsuccessful in
granting relief because it lacks the capacity to account for implicit bias).
12. Thus far the Kentucky Racial Justice Act is the only piece of state legislation to
The
be passed addressing racial discrimination in death penalty sentencing.
effectiveness of the Kentucky statute has yet to be tested in the courts. The United
States Congress twice attempted to pass national legislation on the issue but failed, in
1988 and 1994.
13. See Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REv. 1124,
1129 (2012) (defining explicit bias as stereotypes and attitudes that are "consciously
accessible through introspection and endorsed as appropriate").
14. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 82-83 (1986) (examining a situation
where the prosecutor struck all four black potential jurors, creating an all-white jury to
try a black man accused of burglary and receipt of stolen goods).
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consider a case against a person of that same race.' 5 The Court also
announced a test called the Batson challenge designed to aid trial courts in
detecting peremptory strikes motivated by explicit bias.16 The challenge
begins when the defense objects on the record to a peremptory strike that
appears to be motivated by race.17 Next, the prosecution must offer a raceneutral reason for striking the juror.'8 Finally, the trial court judge renders
an immediate decision as to whether to allow the peremptory strike.' 9
The Batson challenge is utilized in capital cases today only to root out
explicit racial bias.20 The trial court judge's decision usually turns on the
strength of the prosecution's race-neutral explanation. 2' Thus, the court
ultimately tests whether the prosecutor's strike was an intentional act of
discrimination, not whether implicit bias motivated the strike.22 As long as
the prosecutor provides a race-neutral explanation to the court, the
peremptory strike stands.23
B. The Court Has Failedto Address Implicit Bias That PervadesJury
Selection in the Death Penalty Process.
Implicit biases are "attitudes and stereotypes that are not consciously
accessible through introspection." 2 4 Thus, when implicit bias prevails,
individuals do not recognize their discriminatory actions because the

15. See id. at 89 (grounding its ruling in the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment). Contra Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 222 (1965)
(refusing to examine a prosecutor's peremptory strike under a Fourteenth Amendment
Equal Protection analysis).
16. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 85-86 (recognizing that although a defendant is not
entitled to a jury including members of his own race, he is entitled not to have those
jurors excluded on the basis of race (citing Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303,
305 (1880))).
17. See id. at 96 (placing the initial burden of proof on the defense counsel to make
a prima facie showing of discrimination).
18. See id. at 97 (emphasizing that a prosecutor does not have to meet the same
threshold as justifying a juror struck for cause).
19. See id. at 99 (omitting any possible guidelines for trial court judges to follow to
weigh the respective arguments raised by both parties).
20. See Jeffrey Bellin & Junichi Semitsu, Widening Batson's Net to Ensnare More
Than the UnapologeticallyBigoted or Painfully UnimaginativeAttorney, 96 CORNELL
L. REV. 1075, 1085-86 (2011) (juxtaposing the need for peremptory strikes to be free of
racial discrimination with the entrenched history of peremptory strikes as a part of the
justice system).
21. See, e.g., Golphin 1, 533 S.E.2d 168, 215 (N.C. 2000) (giving deference to the
trial court's ruling by refusing to find the peremptory strikes discriminatory).
22. See, e.g., id. at 211 (setting forth the various factors to be considered to
determine whether the prosecutor has exhibited intentional discrimination).
23. See, e.g., Golphin II, 519 F.3d 168, 183-84 (4th Cir. 2008) (affirming the ruling
of the lower court to deny relief based on prejudicial jury strikes).
24. See Kang et al., supra note 13, at 1130.
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behavior is a subconscious product of social constructs.25 These social
constructs are often based on racial stereotypes that alter interaction with an
individual believed to be part of an associated group.2 6 These subconscious
behaviors may specifically guide decisions in a courtroom during jury
selection.27
As critics of Batson note, the framework prohibits courts from
considering discrimination in any context other than an intentional act by
the prosecutor.28 This creates a problem when dealing with implicit racial
bias. 2 9 For example, a prosecutor may subconsciously associate black
jurors with a stereotype that assumes that blacks generally distrust
authority. 30 This social construct may in turn cause the prosecutor to
approach questioning the juror differently or to interpret the juror's
responses differently. 3' Subconscious social constructs may dictate that a
simple "yes" or "no" response from a black juror reflects the juror being
uncooperative or unresponsive, while the juror likely believes that he or she
The prosecutor's
is simply answering the prosecutor's question. 32
perception of an uncooperative juror may then lead to a peremptory
strike.33 Both the judge and the prosecutor may be unaware of the implicit
discrimination that caused the prosecutor to make the strike. 34 Once the
prosecutor proffers the juror's demeanor as a race-neutral reason for the

25. See Jerry Kang, Implicit Bias and the Pushbackfrom the Left, 54 ST. Louis U.
L.J. 1139, 1143 (2010) (providing a model of racial mechanics to articulate how race is
a social construction).
26. See id. (focusing on the bilateral interaction between the perceiver and the
target that follows a pattern of classifying the target individual based on mapping rules
provided by cultural perceptions).
27. See Kang et al., supra note 13, at 1142 (suggesting that there is no evidence
that courtrooms would be absent of implicit bias).
28. See Bellin & Semitsu, supra note 20, at 1078 (blaming persistent racism injury
selection on the Batson framework rather than the judges making decisions).
29. See id (explaining but not excusing the mechanics of implicit bias that occurs
at the subconscious level and where the actor is only sometimes aware of implicit bias
through a conscious effort not to engage in such actions).
30. See generally Robert J. Smith & Justin D. Levinson, The Impact of Implicit
Bias on the Exercise of ProsecutorialDiscretion, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 795, 797
(2012) (citing research that supports the notion that most people harbor negative
attitudes towards blacks and other disadvantaged groups).
31. See id. at 819 (proposing that implicit bias provides a plausible explanation for
the disproportionate strikes made by prosecutors who insist on egalitarian intentions).
32. See generally id. at 802 (observing that results from the Implicit Association
Test reveal that participants associate blacks with negative characteristics such as bad,
unpleasant, aggressive, or lazy).
33. See id. at 819 (recognizing that prosecutors may strike black jurors for
behaviors implicitly associated with race that on the surface will appear race neutral).
34. See id. at 818 (quoting Justice Powell in Batson as advocating for the abolition
of the peremptory strike because it was too easy for discrimination to go undetected).
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strike, the strike will likely stand.
Just one year after Batson, the Court missed another opportunity to
address implicit bias in McCleskey v. Kemp, the case of a Georgia death
row inmate who contested his death sentence under the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments using statistical analysis. 36 The analysis in the
case showed disparate patterns that indicated a defendant was more likely
to receive a death sentence if the victim of the crime was white.37 Despite
the statistical evidence presented, the Court failed to find that race had
influenced the imposition of the death sentence since McCleskey could not
prove that the prosecutor intentionally sought the death sentence based on
his race.3 8
The Court distinguished capital punishment from other instances where
statistics are often used to prove discrimination, explaining that in the
latter, an institution facing accusations of racism often has the opportunity
to rebut the assumptions made by the statistics.39 In capital sentencing,
however, the Court felt that extraneous variables within the statistics would
prevent reliable conclusions. 40 Nevertheless, the Court invited state
legislatures to curb racial discrimination by incorporating statistical
analysis into their own death penalty review schemes. 4'
C. The 2009 Racial JusticeAct Accounts for Both Explicit and Implicit
Racial Bias.4 2

After McCleskey, it was clear that innovative methods were needed to
combat the implicit prejudices of the capital punishment system.43 In 2009,
35. See id at 819 (noting that although most prosecutors today do not strive to
intentionally exclude black jurors, implicit bias persists in strike decisions).
36. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 286 (1987) (reviewing a study
performed by Professor Baldus that included over 2000 Georgia murder cases that
occurred during the 1970s).
37. See id. (finding that crimes involving white victims received the death penalty
in eleven percent of cases while crimes involving black victims only received the death
penalty in one percent of cases).
38. See id. at 298 (explaining that for McCleskey to prove racial discrimination, he
had the more difficult burden of proving discriminatory intent rather than only proving
a disparate pattern, as the study showed).
39. See id. at 296 (drawing on examples of claims of discrimination in Title VII
cases).
40. See id. at 295-96 n.15 (including variables such as the drafting of capital
punishment legislation, decisions to arrest and prosecute, and decisions made by the
jury).
41. See id at 319 (arguing that since legislatures are elected bodies, they are better
qualified to weigh evidence).
42. The 2009 Racial Justice Act was interpreted as a matter of first impression in
Robinson v. North Carolina,discussed in Part II.D.
43. See Shaila Dewan, Study Finds Blacks Blocked from Southern Juries, N.Y.
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/02/us/02jury.html
TIMES
(June
1, 2010),
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North Carolina passed the Racial Justice Act, which commutes any death
sentence to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole if a prisoner
can prove that race was a significant factor in seeking the death penalty.4
The statute detailed three methods by which relief could be granted: (1) the
prisoner can demonstrate that race was a significant factor based on the
race of the defendant; (2) the prisoner can demonstrate that race was a
significant factor based on the race of the victim; and (3) the prisoner can
demonstrate that race was a significant factor in jury strikes.4 5
Some of the key statutory provisions in the 2009 Racial Justice Act
suggest that it was implemented to combat implicit racial bias. The most
striking example is the statute's overt endorsement of using statistical
evidence to satisfy a showing of racial discrimination, a notion that the
McCleskey Court had previously refused.47 During a debate, North
Carolina State Senator Doug Berger implored the Senate to accept statistics
as proof of racial discrimination because of the difficult nature of proving
racial discrimination.4 8 The senator drew parallels to the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 and underscored that plaintiffs often use statistics to prove
discrimination in employment decisions.49
Another key provision of the North Carolina statute is that it requires no
evidence of intentional discrimination in the defendant's case.o The
legislative history encourages a plain reading of the statute which states
that a prisoner may win relief simply by proving discrimination within the
(demonstrating the continuing need for racial justice legislation that considers implicit

bias by recognizing that North Carolina has never had a Batson challenge overturned).
44. See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-2011 (West 2011) (defining a significant
factor as having or likely to have influence or effect (citing State v. Sexton, 336 N.C.
321, 375 (1994)).
45. See id § 15A-2012 (recognizing from a body of evidence presented in the
legislature that the death penalty is sought more often for black defendants and crimes
involving white victims).
46. See id. § 15A-2011 (allowing for the use of statistics to show patterns of
discrimination over time and not requiring evidence of intent or a showing of
prejudice).
47. See Robinson v. North Carolina, No. 91 CRS 23143, slip op. at 31 (N.C. Super.
Ct. Apr. 20, 2012) (guiding this determination by the Federal Judicial Center's
Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence and previous North Carolina Supreme Court
decisions that define significant factor as something that has or is likely to have
influence or effect).
48. See Seth Kotch & Robert Mosteller, The Racial Justice Act and the Long
Struggle with Race and the Death Penalty in North Carolina, 88 N.C. L. REv. 2031,
2112-13 (2010) (arguing that if the Civil Rights Act of 1964 did not incorporate
statistical evidence, society would not have moved forward).
49. See id. at 2113 n.360 (agreeing with Senator Glazier that if statistics are
allowed as evidence for individuals to keep their jobs, statistics should be allowed as
evidence to save a man's life).
50. See Robinson, No. 91 CRS 23143, slip op. at 34 (interpreting the statute to
grant relief upon a showing of race as a significant factor in the county, prosecutorial
district, judicial division, or state).
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county, prosecutorial district, judicial division, or state. 5' Earlier versions
of the bill indicate that the words "in his or her case" initially appeared in
the text of the bill, suggesting a requirement to prove discrimination in the
case at issue. 5 2 During a floor debate, Senator Doug Berger advocated for
the Senate to consider the reality of discrimination, where he said no
reasonable person, including prosecutors, would ever admit to acting from
racial bias, demonstrating a clear need to exclude evidence of an intent
requirement.
D. The Robinson Trial Proves That the 2009 RacialJustice Act Can Be
Successful in CombatingImplicit Racial Bias.
On April 20, 2012, the first application of the 2009 Racial Justice Act
was decided by Judge Gregory Weeks in North Carolina v. Robinson.54
Marcus Robinson's death sentence was commuted to life in prison after he
proved that race was a significant factor in the improper jury strikes made
at his trial.ss
Using a statistical analysis as evidence of racial discrimination was
critical to counteracting implicit bias because the results were able to show
patterns of bias over time.56 Robinson's defense counsel used a statistical
analysis performed by a team of professors from Michigan State University
(MSU Study) that included unadjusted data and a controlled-regression
analysis to prove that patterns of racial discrimination existed in his trial, in
Cumberland County, in the Prosecutorial District 12 , in the Second
Judicial Division, and in the state of North Carolina." The MSU Study
51. See § 15A-2011(b) (enacting such a provision in support of incorporating
disparate impact analysis into racial discrimination statutes that address arbitrary
application of the death penalty).
52. See Robinson, No. 91 CRS 23143, slip op. at 36 ("The General Assembly
removed a provision contained in an earlier version of the bill that required a defendant
to show 'with particularity how the evidence supports a claim that racial considerations
played a significant part in the decision to seek or impose a death sentence in his or her
case."').
53. See Kotch & Mosteller, supra note 48, at 2112 (insisting that in modem times,
individuals will not admit to actions being motivated by "the color of a [person's]
skin").
54. See Robinson, No. 91 CRS 23143, slip op. at 167 (ordering that Marcus
Robinson's life be spared, and his death sentence be changed to life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole).
55. See id. at 166 (handing down a decision that detailed a statistical study that was

commended by the court for incorporating proper sample size, methodology, and for
being responsive to new information).
56. See generally Kang et al., supra note 13, at 1130 (chronicling the extensive

psychological research that utilizes the Implicit Association Test to track the
relationship between stereotypes and implicit bias).
57. Cumberland County and Prosecutorial District 12 constitute the same
geographical area.
58. See Robinson, No. 91 CRS 23143, slip op. at 165 (proving that Robinson
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predicted a ninety-five percent or better chance that the peremptory strikes
were based on race, and the court found the study statistically significant. 59
Using the data from the MSU Study, the court was also able to adopt the
four-fifths rule, which assumes practical significance when the minority's
success rate is less than four-fifths of the success rate of the majority, as it
was in Robinson's trial. 6 0
The state had a difficult task rebutting the presumption of bias created by
the defense counsel. 6 1 In Robinson, the court ruled that the prosecution was
unable to overcome that presumption, and the unadjusted data alone proved
that race was a significant factor in the peremptory strikes in Robinson's

case.62
Though Robinson was able to prove that the racially motivated
peremptory strikes in his case were intentional, there was no requirement to
prove intent under the 2009 Racial Justice Act.63 The court, however,
heard lengthy testimony on the difficulty of proving implicit bias in racial
discrimination cases, including testimony by an expert witness for the
defense.64 The expert witness discussed implicit bias in the context of a
Batson challenge. 65 The witness explained that when individuals are
confronted with the notion of their own prejudicial tendencies, they often
try to rationalize their behavior by disguising the prejudice as something
different.66 Therefore, in the context of a Batson challenge, when the court
asks a prosecutor why a potential juror was struck, the prosecutor is unable
suffered discrimination under both a disparate treatment and disparate impact analysis).
59. See id. at 31-32 (allowing only a five percent margin of error due to chance
(citing Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 495-96 n.17 (1977) and Hazelwood Sch.
Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 309 n.4 (1977))).
60. See id. at 32-33 (borrowing the standard from the Equal Opportunity
Employment Commission and applying it to the Racial Justice Act whereby the prima
facie burden is met if less than four-fifths of qualified black jurors are seated compared
with qualified white jurors).
61. See, e.g., id. at 119-20 (requiring the prosecution to rebut a statewide statistical
regression analysis rather than simply stating a race-neutral reason for the peremptory
strikes).
62. See id. at 162 (concluding that race was a significant factor in prosecutors'
peremptory strike decisions in the county, judicial division, and state in 1994); see also
id. at 105-07 (refuting the prosecution expert's own analysis of jury strikes due to
improper sampling and study design).
63. See id. at 164-65, 167 (granting relief since defense counsel proved intentional
discrimination in Robinson's trial, Cumberland County, the Second Judicial Division,
and North Carolina).
64. See id. at 116-17 (testifying as to findings of his own published research
exploring implicit racial bias in the context of jury selection).
65. See id. at 117 (noting specifically that Batson challenges are not conducive to
uncovering implicit racial bias because of the intentional nature of the response
expected of prosecutors for courts to prove discrimination).
66. See id. (expressing that scientific studies have shown that most people are
genuinely unaware of their subconscious biases).
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to articulate a reason that accurately takes implicit bias into account. 67 One
of the prosecutors from Robinson's own trial even admitted in testimony
that a person who may not intend to discriminate may do so
unconsciousy. 68
E. The 2012 Amendment Eviscerates the Purpose of the Act to Eliminate
Implicit Bias.

Despite the court recently granting relief in Robinson's case under the
2009 Racial Justice Act, North Carolina state legislators voted to amend the
statute on June 13, 2012, curtailing the provisions that worked to neutralize
implicit bias. 69 This raises serious concerns for North Carolina's death row
prisoners who raised appeals under the previous version of the Racial
Justice Act that their chances of bringing a successful claim have
diminished.70
The 2012 Amendment limits the use of statistics in the courtroom to
prove discrimination under the statute. 7' Although the statute still allows
for statistical evidence regarding jury selection in the individual case,
county, and prosecutorial district, judicial division and statewide statistics
are no longer acceptable. 7 2 Furthermore, statistical evidence alone is
insufficient to grant relief under the amended statute.73 In addition to
geographical limitations, the statistics allowed into evidence must be
confined to a time frame from ten years before the commission of the
offense to two years after the imposition of the death sentence. 74
Constraining the use of statistics will be detrimental to the defense
counsel's likelihood of successfully establishing a prima facie showing of
67. See id. (asserting that the Baldus study from the McCleskey trial largely
supported the notion that prosecutors may be unaware of their bias and therefore unable
to acknowledge it in court challenges).
68. See id. at 118 (admitting specifically that there was a chance that he engaged in
discrimination injury selection for Robinson's own trial).

69. See generally James Eng, North Carolina Lawmakers Move to Scale Back
Racial Justice Act, NBC NEws BLOG (Jun. 14, 2012, 3:01 PM),
http://usnews.nbcnews.com/ news/2012/06/14/12223532-north-carolina-lawmakersmove-to-scale-back-racial-justice-act?lite (voting to pass the bill by a landslide count of
seventy-three in favor of the bill to forty-seven against after overriding Governor
Perdue's veto).

70. See generally Bryan Mims, North Carolina Judge Sets Racial Justice Act

Appeals for October, WRAL (July 5, 2012), http://www.wral.com/news/state/story/
11284405/ (reporting that over 150 death row prisoners of all races have filed appeals
under the 2009 version of the Racial Justice Act).
71. See Act of July 2, 2012, 2012 N.C. Sess. Laws 136, sec. 3, § 15A-201 1(a)
(2012) (eliminating the possibility of granting relief based on the judicial division or
statewide discriminatory practices).
72. Id.
73. Id. sec. 3, § 15A-201 1(e).
74. Id.
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discrimination.
A narrow interpretation of the 2012 Amendment would also appear to
incorporate the intentional discrimination requirement that the North
76
Carolina State Senate fought so desperately to avoid in 2009. An intent
provision would require defense counsel to prove explicit bias by showing
that a prosecutor intentionally discriminated based on race, a burden that
becomes nearly impossible given the prosecutor's surreptitious decisionmaking process, which unavoidably includes implicit bias.77
F. Golphin Illustrates How Both Versions of the Racial Justice Act Address
Explicit andImplicit Bias.

In his Motion for Appropriate Relief to the Cumberland County Superior
Court, Tilman Golphin challenged his sentence under the third method of
the Racial Justice Act, arguing that race was a significant factor in the juror
strikes in his trial.78 Golphin and his younger brother were convicted of
first-degree murder and sentenced to death for the killing of two law
enforcement officers during a traffic stop. 7 9 Throughout the appeals
process, Golphin challenged the use of the prosecution's peremptory strikes
against two black jurors.80 None of the courts, however, found error in the
trial court's Batson ruling that the prosecutor's strikes were not made on
the basis of race. 8 '
The lower courts rejected Golphin's contention that race played a part in
the prosecution's peremptory strikes of two black jurors.82 While the court
may have been correct in judging the outcome of the Batson challenge
based on explicit bias, the test did not allow the court to test for implicit
bias.83 At the time of Golphin's case, the only way to challenge a racially
75. See id sec. 3, § 15A-201 1(d)-(f) (limiting the types of evidence available to the
defense counsel to only anecdotal and historical evidence).
76. See id. sec. 3, § 15A-2011(f) (including the words "in the defendant's case" to
parts of the statute which suggests an individual intent requirement).
77. See id (refuting the notion that evidence of discrimination in the relevant
geographic regions alone is sufficient to establish a pattern of discrimination and to
grant relief under the statute).
78. See generally Mims, supra note 70 (reporting that Judge Gregory Weeks held a
preliminary hearing for Golphin's appeal on July 6, 2012).
79. See Golphin I, 533 S.E.2d 168, 184-85 (N.C. 2000).
80. See id. at 210 (alleging that the trial court did not conduct an adequate inquiry
into the peremptory strikes of jurors Holder and Murray); see also Golphin II, 519 F.3d
168, 179 (4th Cir. 2008) (challenging the Supreme Court of North Carolina's
application of Batson).
81. See Golphin II, 519 F.3d at 187-88 (denying relief under the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause after failing to find evidence of explicit racial
bias but failing to consider whether implicit bias played a part in the strikes).
82. See Golphin I, 533 S.E.2d at 212-14.
83. See generally Robinson v. North Carolina, No. 91 CRS 23143, slip op. at 114-
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motivated peremptory strike was using Batson criteria. 84 Since Batson only
considers explicit racial bias, it is possible that the prosecutor's peremptory
strikes were fueled by implicit bias and completely overlooked by the
courts.
In Golphin's most recent Motion for Appropriate Relief, originally filed
under the 2009 Racial Justice Act, the parties requested to brief the case
under the 2009 Racial Justice Act and the 2012 Amendment. 86 Briefing
both versions of the statute gave the parties an opportunity to highlight the
key differences between the 2009 Racial Justice Act and the 2012
Amendment.87
III. ANALYSIS

A racial justice statute should include statutory elements that allow for
consideration of both explicit and implicit racial bias.88 Elements favorable
to uncovering both kinds of bias, such as including statistics as permissible
evidence and excluding a requirement for proof of intentional
discrimination, are examined through a comparison of the 2009 North
Carolina Racial Justice Act and the 2012 Amendment as applied to Tilmon
Golphin's case. 8 9
A. Allowing StatisticalAnalysis as Sufficient Evidence to Prove
Discriminationand GrantRelief Under the Racial JusticeAct Is Imperative
to CounteractImplicit Bias in Jury Selection in the Golphin Case.
1. The 2009 RacialJustice Act Will ProvideRelieffor Golphin Using
Statistics as Evidence ofDiscrimination.
If Golphin were to be decided under the 2009 Racial Justice Act, the
16 (N.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 20, 2012) (explaining that to reduce the chance of making an
incorrect judgment on racial bias, we should improve conditions of decision-making).
84. See Golphin 1, 533 S.E.2d at 210 (forbidding the use of peremptory strikes for a
discriminatory purpose).
85. See Smith & Levinson, supra note 30, at 818 (explaining that policing
peremptory strikes has not been successful).
86. See Mims, supra note 70 (requesting a breadth of argument in light of the
uncertainty of the retroactivity of the newly amended Racial Justice Act).
87. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-2011 (West 2011) (enumerating various
provisions that will address the racial biases inherent in jury selection through varying
thresholds of evidence presented by defense counsel and the prosecution), with Act of
July 2, 2012, 2012 N.C. Sess. Laws 136, sec. 3, § 15A-2011 (2012) (providing for
different evidence allowable under the statute to grant relief).
88. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-2011 (West 2011) (providing relief to a
defendant based on improper racial bias during jury selection).
89. See Golphin 11, 519 F.3d 168, 179 (4th Cir. 2008) (citing a narrow spectrum of
available evidence of discrimination and a requirement to prove intentional
discrimination).
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court should follow the ruling in Robinson and find that race was a
significant factor in jury selection based on statistics alone, as was the case
in Robinson.90 Under the 2009 Racial Justice Act the burden of proof
would remain with the defendant, Golphin, to prove a prima facie case of
discrimination. 91 The type of evidence available to Golphin to prove racial
discrimination in the peremptory strikes, however, would be broader under
the 2009 Racial Justice Act and would enable the court to consider implicit
bias.92 For example, Golphin would be able to use any statistics, as well as
other empirical or anecdotal evidence, to prove that race was a significant
factor under the statute. 93 In Robinson, the court ruled that the unadjusted
data in the MSU Study showed that race was a statistically significant
factor in peremptory strikes in capital cases in the county, prosecutorial
district, judicial division, and state where the case was tried.94
Since Golphin's trial took place in the same geographic location and
time frame as Robinson, applying the same study in Golphin would
likewise reveal disparate patterns in jury selection.95 In Golphin's trial, a
special venire was chosen from Johnston County to resolve defense
counsel's motion for a change of venue.9 6 The MSU Study confirms that of
the seven capital cases tried in Johnston County, 52.38% of black venire
members were struck from the jury panel, whereas 28.23% of white venire
members were struck form the jury panel. 9 7 The numbers were similar for
Cumberland County in the Robinson case, where in eleven capital cases,
52.69% of black venire members were struck from the jury panel while
only 20.48% of white venire members were struck. 9 8 The experts
90. See Robinson v. North Carolina, No. 91 CRS 23143, slip op. at 162 (N.C.
Super. Ct. Apr. 20, 2012) (finding statistics alone sufficient to prove race as a
significant factor).
91. See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-201 1(c) (West 2011) (explaining that the
court has the final determination in weighing whether the prosecution has successfully
rebutted the defense counsel's prima facie showing).
92. See id. § 15A-201 1(b) (listing statistical evidence and other evidence such as
sworn testimony as acceptable); cf Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 95 (1986)
(accepting only accounts of the prosecutor's intentions and strike patterns as evidence
of racial discrimination).
93. Cf Robinson, No. 91 CRS 23143, slip op. at 69 (holding that race was a
significant factor in the peremptory strikes in Golphin's trial, county, and state).
94. See id. at 70 (basing the holding on the study's finding of statistically
significant strike patterns in all three geographic areas).
95. Cf id. at I (bearing the date of the trial as 1994); Golphin 1, 533 S.E.2d 168,
183 (N.C. 2000) (indicating that Golphin was convicted in 1998).
96. See Golphin 1, 533 S.E.2d at 189 (recording that both defendants requested a
change of venue and after a disputed conference, all parties stipulated to keeping the
trial in Cumberland County, but drawing a special venire from neighboring Johnston
County).
97. See Robinson, No. 91 CRS 23143, slip op. at 64 (combining for a strike rate
ratio of 1.9).
98. See id. at 63 (reporting a strike rate ratio of 2.6).
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conducting the study considered the results statistically significant in both
counties since blacks were struck nearly twice as often as whites. 99 Under
the 2009 Racial Justice Act, based on the statistics and expert testimony, a
court should hold that the peremptory strikes made in Johnston County are
evidence that race was a significant factor in the peremptory strike
decisions.00

The study also suggests that implicit racial bias played some part in each
individual trial examined.'0 ' In Golphin's trial 71.4% of black venire
members were struck, in contrast with only 35.8% of white venire
members.10 2 Again, these numbers were only slightly less irregular than
Robinson's case, where 50.0% of black venire members were struck
compared to 14.3% of white venire members.' 0 3 The study noted that in
only one capital trial was the peremptory strike rate ratio of races of jurors
almost equivalent and thus not statistically significant.10 4
Applying the four-fifths statistical inquiry used in Robinson to the MSU
Study in Golphin would also demonstrate that peremptory strikes in both
Johnston County and in Golphin's individual trial indicate the presence of
implicit racial bias.' 05 In Johnston County, 71.77% of whites were
successfully seated on a jury, but only 47.62% of blacks were successfully
seated.10 6 In Golphin's individual trial, 64.2% of whites were successfully

seated, whereas only 28.6% of blacks were seated. 0 7 These numbers
illustrate a stark racial disparity in jury selection in Johnston County and in
Golphin's case that can be explained by implicit, but not explicit, racial
bias.'o'

99. See id. at 63-64 (noting that the strike rate ratio in Cumberland County in
Robinson was slightly higher at 2.6 than Johnston County in Golphin with 1.9,
measuring against an ideal strike rate ratio of 1).
100. See id. at 67 (finding that strikes used in neighboring counties demonstrated
that black jurors were struck from juries at a disproportionate rate).
101. See id. (finding a nearly equal strike rate for death row inmate Richard E.
Cagle's trial).
102. See id at 66 (combining for a strike rate ratio of 1.99).
103. See id (recording a strike rate ratio of 3.50).
104. See id. at 66-67 (indicating that implicit bias played a role in all but one capital
trial since blacks were being struck at a disproportionate rate).
105. See id at 65-66 (computing the four-fifths -rule using the difference of the
reported number ofjurors struck).
106. See id. at 63-64 (falling short of the 57.41% threshold needed to pass a fourfifths inquiry).
107. See id at 66 (falling far below the requisite 51.36% required by the four-fifths
test).
108. See id at 66 (finding that both inquiries fail the four-fifths challenge analysis in
Golphin despite the fact that no court previously found a Batson violation which would
have indicated explicit bias).
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2. Allowing Statistics as Evidence to Prove Implicit Bias Under the 2009
RacialJustice Act Weakens the Prosecution'sRebuttal Argument in

Golphin.
Once Golphin asserts statistical evidence in an effort to prove that the
jury strikes in his case were products of implicit bias and racial
discrimination, the prosecution has the opportunity to present its own
rebuttal case, which may also include the use of statistics.1 09 If Golphin's
defense counsel uses the MSU Study or a similar statistical analysis that
shows such widespread bias in jury selection in North Carolina, it will be
more difficult for the prosecution to effectively rebut defense counsel's
argument under the 2009 Racial Justice Act." 0
In Robinson, the prosecution attempted to counteract the evidence
presented by defense counsel by hiring an expert, Joseph Katz, to analyze
the defense's MSU Study."' Katz conducted several regression analyses,
specifically with the intent to find some combination of variables that made
the peremptory strikes in Robinson's trial statistically insignificant."12
Katz, however, found no instances where the results were statistically
insignificant, which further substantiated the defense counsel's claim that
the peremptory strikes were motivated by implicit bias." 3
If Golphin similarly presents a study examining the statewide
peremptory strike ratios in North Carolina, it will be difficult for the
prosecution to rebut his conclusion that the strikes were motivated by
implicit bias.1 4 Since the Golphin trial fits into the same time frame and
geographic location that the MSU Study covers, the statistical conclusions
should remain unchanged, thus favoring relief for Golphin under the 2009
Racial Justice Act.' '5
109. See generally N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-2011 (West 2011) (maintaining that
the burden of proof remains with the defense).
110. Cf Robinson, No. 91 CRS 23143, slip op. at 107 (finding that the prosecution's
expert witness failed to create a reliable analysis to discredit the defense counsel's
findings that race was a significant factor in the strike decisions).
11. See id. at 25-26 (testifying at a discovery hearing that his research would
include either an investigation into the accuracy of the MSU Study by confirming
results with local prosecutors or a compilation of non-racial explanations for black
struck jurors).
112. See id. (presenting an analysis with the goal of explaining that there are many
possible reasons for a peremptory strike, rather than seeking to find the true reason for
each strike against a black juror).
113. See id at 105-07 (deeming the Katz study to be unreliable since the
methodology employed is not generally accepted by the scientific community because
it spreads the data set too thinly to draw meaningful conclusions and produces models
that are unreliable because they are over fit).
114. See id. at 108 (concluding, based on statistical evidence presented at trial, that
race was a significant factor in peremptory strike decisions in North Carolina from
1990 to 2010).
115. See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-2011(c) (West 2011) (defining the
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3. The Time Frame Constraintson Available Statistics Under the 2012
Amendment Will Not Greatly Affect Golphin, but the Constraints Will
Harm Future Defendants.
The 2012 Amendment that limits the use of statistics in the courtroom to
prove discrimination will not affect Golphin, but it will unfairly bar future
defendants in smaller counties from procuring relief under the statute.16
The statistics allowed into evidence must be confined to a time frame of ten
years before the commission of the offense to two years after the
imposition of the death sentence. 17 Constraining the scope of statistics
would have a negative effect on defendants in the majority of counties in
North Carolina by limiting the history of discriminatory strikes that could
be considered by the court.' Although Cumberland and Johnston County
where the Robinson and Golphin jurors were drawn have hosted eighteen
combined capital trials, the average county in North Carolina will see less
than three capital trials in the allowed time span.19 This means that even
though statistics are permitted at the county level, most counties will not be
able to supply data that will provide meaningful conclusions because there
simply will not be enough data to compare.12 0 While the new standards for
statistical evidence would not greatly affect the availability of statistics in
Golphin, such standards would force many of the other counties to make
decisions without the statistics.1 2 1 Leaving statistics out of the courtroom
will allow for implicit bias to continue without any meaningful tool for the
courts to detect it. 122
4. A NarrowInterpretationof the 2012 Amendment Will Not ProvideRelief
to Golphin Because of the GeographicalConstraintsofAvailable Statistics.
Although the statute allows for statistical evidence regarding jury

defendant's burden to prove that race was a significant factor in the decision to seek or

impose the death penalty).
116. See Act of July 2, 2012, 2012 N.C. Sess. Laws 136, sec. 3, § 15A-2011(a)
(2012) (excluding the clause that allows for statistical evidence of discrimination in the
judicial district and state, which in turn diminishes the Act's ability to showcase
patterns of racial discrimination).
117. Id.

118. See Robinson, No. 91 CRS 23143, slip op. at 63-64 (relying on statistical
evidence regarding the average rate per case in which prosecutors struck jurors).
119. See id. (averaging only 2.8 trials per county).

120. See id.
(recognizing the need for a statewide analysis to show complete patterns
and comparisons).
121. See Act of July 2, 2012, 2012 N.C. Sess. Laws 136, sec. 3, § 15A-2011(a)
(2012) (restraining the availability of statistics to ensure that only those immediately
and explicitly relevant to the trial at hand will be presented to the court).
122. See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-2011 (West 2011) (addressing implicit bias
outright in an effort to seek justice in jury selection).
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selection in the individual case, county, and prosecutorial district, statistical
evidence alone is insufficient to grant relief under a narrow interpretation
of the 2012 Amendment.12 3 While the new statute allows for statistics to be
used as supporting evidence, the 2012 Amendment removed the portion of
the statute that allowed for statistical evidence from the relevant judicial
district as well as statewide evidence.12 4 As a result, the statewide statistics
used in the MSU Study in Robinson's trial would not be permitted as
evidence under a narrow interpretation of the 2012 Amendment.' 2 5
Similarly, a narrow interpretation of the 2012 Amendment would
prohibit Golphin from using the controlled regression analysis used in
Robinson since the statistics sample statewide data.126 Under the 2009
Racial Justice Act, the MSU Study from Robinson's trial was successful in
proving that a racial disparity in seated jurors persisted even when the top
four race-neutral reasons for striking jurors were controlled.12 7 When the
cross-tabulation study removed many of the factors that would make for a
sympathetic juror, such as someone with reservations about the death
penalty, someone who had been accused of a crime or had a close friend or
family member accused of a crime, or someone knowing a trial participant,
qualified black jurors were disproportionately removed from the jury 2.1
times more often than white jurors. 128 Additionally, when the study
removed all jurors who were unemployed, qualified black jurors were 2.0
times more likely than white jurors to be removed.129 The study
demonstrates that the current jury strikes are motivated by implicit racial
bias that cannot be explained by non-racial justifications.130
The statewide controlled regression analysis, however, is not irrelevant
to the determination of the peremptory strikes in Golphin.'3 1 It illustrates
123. See Act of July 2, 2012, 2012 N.C. Sess. Laws 136, sec. 3, § 15A-2011(c)
(2012) (granting relief only where the defendant can prove that race was a significant
factor in the relevant county or prosecutorial district where the strike took place).
124. See id. sec. 3, § 15A-201 1(a) (allowing for statistical evidence only to be used
in a supporting role for the defense).
125. See Robinson, No. 91 CRS 23143, slip op. at 71 (using a controlled regression
analysis that examined juror strikes on the statewide level).
126. See Act of July 2, 2012, 2012 N.C. Sess. Laws 136, sec. 3, § 15A-2011(a)
(2012) (deleting the availability of statewide data used as statistical evidence of racial
discrimination).
127. See Robinson, No. 91 CRS 23143, slip. op. at 72 (calculating the specific rates
at which the remaining jurors were struck by race).
128. See id. at 72-73 (questioning the persistence of racial disparities in peremptory
strikes after typical explanatory categories have been removed).
129. See id. at 72 (persisting in recognizing that implicit bias must be playing a role
since other common variables have been controlled).
130. See id. (finding the strike rates to be almost identical even when the most
popular race-neutral proffered reasons are omitted from the calculation).
131. See id. (showing a pattern of biased behavior by the prosecutor dispelling the
most common instances of implicit bias).
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that even when race-neutral explanations are controlled, black venire
members are struck at a higher rate than white venire members.' 3 2 This
type of analysis indicates that implicit racial bias persists in peremptory
strikes despite the implementation of the Batson challenge.,33
By
eliminating the breadth of available statewide statistics under a narrow
interpretation, the courts will be forced to ignore these telling patterns of
implicit bias-patterns that would not otherwise become known using an
explicit bias inquiry such as the Batson challenge.13 4
5. The Prosecution'sRebuttal Will Be Stronger in Golphin Under a
Narrow Interpretationof the 2012 Amendment Because the Statute Does
Not Place Limitations on the Prosecution's Use of Statistics.

In addition to limiting the defense's use of statistics to prove
discrimination, a narrow interpretation of the 2012 Amendment places no
limitation on the prosecution's use of statistics as evidence.' 35 Since the
statute lacks such a mandate, the extent of the prosecution's reliance on
statistics would therefore be left to a judge's discretion, which may result in
an unfair advantage to the prosecution.136
If Robinson had been decided under a narrow interpretation of the 2012
Amendment, the stark differences in admissible evidence would have
heavily favored the prosecution.' 37 For example, the MSU Study would
not have been allowed into evidence because of the scope of the study, but
the statute would not bar the prosecution's rebuttal inquiry conducted by

Joseph Katz.' 3 8
Katz's initial inquiry involved a survey that was sent out to each
prosecution office that was previously involved in a capital trial reviewed

132. See id. at 74 (implying the presence of implicit racial bias at work).
133. See id. (noticing that the sample size of a county or district is not large enough
to produce statistically significant results when removing specific categories of jurors).
134. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 82-83 (1986) (harboring no discussion
throughout the opinion of implicit bias issues).
135. See Act of July 2, 2012, 2012 N.C. Sess. Laws 136, sec. 3, § 15A-201 1(e)
(2012) (mandating that the state may offer rebuttal evidence including but not limited
to statistical evidence while explicitly stating that the defense may not rely solely on
statistics to make its case).
136. Cf Batson, 476 U.S. at 82-83 (utilizing a test that employs a presumption in
favor of the prosecutor).
137. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-2011 (West 2011) (allowing statistics
into evidence with no limitations), with Act of July 2, 2012, 2012 N.C. Sess. Laws 136,
sec. 3, § 15A-201 1(a) (2012) (restricting the statistical evidence that the defense
counsel may present).
138. Cf Act of July 2, 2012, 2012 N.C. Sess. Laws 136, sec. 3, § 15A-201 1(a)
(2012) (placing no similar geographical restrictions on the statistics the state is allowed
to present).
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by the MSU Study.' The inquiry essentially replicated the role of a judge
in a Batson challenge, asking what the race-neutral reason was for striking
each juror involved in the study.140 In Robinson, the trial court never
seriously considered these inquiries because of the low response rate.141 If,
however, the state had ample time to complete the survey, the outcome
would be detrimental to Racial Justice Act claims like Golphin's. 142
For Golphin's case, the state would have ample time to complete the
survey and transfer the responses to a reliable statistical analysis, which
would likely indicate the absence of any racial bias.143 Under a narrow
interpretation of the 2012 Amendment, Golphin's defense would be void of
any meaningful statistics because they would be prohibited by the statute,
and the prosecution's rebuttal would consist of a statistical analysis
showing that the strikes were race-neutral.1 4 4 Once again, implicit bias
would persist, and it would be difficult for the court to find that any racial
discrimination had occurred.14 5
B. To Uncover Implicit Bias in Golphin, the Racial Justice Act Should Not
Require ProofofIntentionalDiscrimination.

The use of statistics and intent requirements serve the same essential
purpose-to root out discriminatory practices.14 6 The language of a statute
will determine whether the statute prohibits acts motivated by explicit or
implicit bias.147 Proving explicit bias tends to be more difficult because the
139. See Robinson v. North Carolina, No. 91 CRS 23143, slip op. at 120 (N.C.
Super. Ct. Apr. 20, 2012) (employing Batson methodology by asking prosecutors to
offer the best race-neutral reason possible for the strikes against black jurors).
140. See id. at 121 (failing to pose the research question as open-ended and failing to
consider possible mixed motives for a peremptory strike that include race-neutral and
racially motivated explanations).
141. See id at 27 (receiving responses for only one half of the surveys that were
distributed).
142. Cf id. at 127 (recognizing that the expert witness' testimony and analysis may
have been strengthened if the State had provided him with its own race-neutral reasons
for striking jurors).
143. Cf id. at 121 (realizing that if data is self-reported, it will often reflect raceneutral intentions because there is a strong psychological motive to deny racially
motivated actions).
144. See Act of July 2, 2012, 2012 N.C. Sess. Laws 136, sec. 3, § 15A-201 1(a)
(2012) (focusing the evidentiary requirements on evidence that will tend to prove
explicit rather than implicit bias).
145. Cf N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-2011 (West 2011) (permitting evidence that
illuminates jury selection tactics fueled by implicit bias).
146. Compare id. (intending to remedy death sentences sought on the basis of race),
with Act of July 2, 2012, 2012 N.C. Sess. Laws 135, sec. 3, § 15A-201 1(a) (2012)
(agreeing to commute death sentences to life imprisonment if discriminatory intent can
be shown).
147. See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-201 1 (West 2011) (noting that since the
scope of the inquiry is generally broader for implicit bias, a finding of implicit bias will
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scope of the inquiry is much narrower, focusing only on the intentional
actions of the person accused of the discrimination. 18 Conversely, proving
implicit bias tends to be somewhat easier since the scope of the inquiry is
broad.14 9 Therefore, implicit bias often lends itself to using statistical
evidence that can illustrate broad patterns that prove discriminatory
intent.'o
These two distinctive methods of proving racial discrimination can lead
to extremely different outcomes.'15 By omitting the proof of intentional
discrimination requirement in the 2009 Racial Justice Act, the legislature
indicated an understanding that implicit bias is best understood by
examining patterns of behavior over time.15 2 By requiring proof of
intentional discrimination under a narrow interpretation of the 2012
Amendment, the law has the capacity to only counteract explicit racial

bias.153
1. Golphin Will Be GrantedRelief Under the 2009 Racial JusticeAct
Because the Act Recognizes the Role ofImplicit RacialBias by Omitting a
Requirementfor ProofofIntentional Discrimination.
The outcome of Golphin will likely depend on whether it is decided
under the 2009 Racial Justice Act or a narrow interpretation of the 2012
Amendment because granting relief may turn on evidencing the intent
requirement.154 In Robinson, the MSU Study was able to prove that race
was a significant factor in the peremptory strikes in the relevant county,
prosecutorial district, judicial division, and state.' 55 The court found that
also incorporate a finding of explicit bias).
148. See Act of July 2, 2012, 2012 N.C. Sess. Laws 136, sec. 3, § 15A-2011 (2012)
(including an element that requires proof of intentional discrimination).
149. See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-2011 (West 2011) (incorporating patterns of
discrimination into the inquiry).
150. See generally Robinson v. North Carolina, No. 91 CRS 23143, slip op. at 13536 (N.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 20, 2012) (encouraging studies to examine as many cases as
possible to compare data points to inform instances of implicit bias since an individual
accused of bias may not have intended or even recognize the discrimination).
151. Compare id at 167 (using a statute that incorporates implicit bias inquiries to
grant relief), with Golphin II, 519 F.3d 168, 181 (4th Cir. 2008) (refusing to grant relief
under an inquiry that only took explicit bias into account).
152. See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-2011 (West 2011) (responding to
McCleskey's invitation for legislatures to consider passing death penalty laws that
incorporate statistics as valuable evidence).
153. See Robinson, No. 91 CRS 23143, slip op. at 110-11 (explaining the difficulty
in proving individual intent in cases of implicit bias in the context of historical
discrimination against blacks).
154. Compare id. at 164-65 (granting relief where no evidence of intent was
required), with Golphin, 519 F.3d at 191-92 (refusing to grant relief where evidence of
intent was required and defense counsel failed to prove explicit bias caused the
peremptory strikes of two black jurors).
155. See Robinson, No. 91 CRS 23143, slip op. at 164 (finding that race was a
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the statistical pattern from the unadjusted data in the study alone was
sufficient to establish implicit racial bias in Robinson's trial.156 Therefore,
the purpose of the 2009 Racial Justice Act was met simply by providing the
statistics showing a disparate impact.' 57 Applying the same test to
Golphin's case, he would likely prevail since the MSU statistical analysis
also showed race was a significant factor in jury selection in his county,
prosecutorial district, and the state. 58 This statistical showing would be
enough to satisfy the requirement for relief under the 2009 Racial Justice
Act since the statistical pattern would be established, indicating the
presence of implicit racial bias.159 There would be no additional intent
showing required for Golphin to prevail under the 2009 Racial Justice
Act.160
The absence of an individualized intent requirement in the 2009 Racial
Justice Act allowed Golphin to supplement his statistics with anecdotal
evidence consistent with the disparate impact model.16 ' Robinson provided
numerous case examples of discrimination in North Carolina, tending to
show that blacks were being struck from juries when giving similar
answers to whites, blacks were being asked different questions than whites,
and blacks were being asked questions specifically targeted at their race.16 2
In the examples Robinson presented to the court, targeted questioning
during voir dire was permissible because, when challenged under the
Batson test, the prosecutors were able to conceal their implicit bias by
offering race-neutral reasons for the strikes to the court.163 Under the 2009
Racial Justice Act, however, those same cases were found by the Robinson

significant factor in the peremptory strikes occurring in Robinson's specific trial).
156. See id. at 164-65 (concluding additionally, that the peremptory strikes in
Robinson's individual trial were intentional).
157. See generally N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-2010 (West 2011) (intending for
relief to be granted to remedy the racial injustice that is instrumental in imposing the
death penalty based on race).
158. Cf Robinson, No. 91 CRS 23143, slip op. at 62-64 (computing that blacks were
twice as likely as whites to be struck from the jury in Johnston County).
159. See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-2011 (West 2011) (requiring the defendant to
make a showing that race was a significant factor in the decision to seek or impose the
death penalty).
160. See id. (triggering relief upon an effective showing of discrimination by defense
counsel).
161. See Robinson, No. 91 CRS 23143, slip op. at 132 (including a case where one
juror was struck because he was a member of the NAACP and another where a juror
was struck because she was a graduate of North Carolina State A&T University).
162. See id. at 133 (recounting the voir dire of one prosecutor asking black jurors if
their black friends would criticize them for finding the defendant guilty of a crime).
163. But see id. at 163-64 (finding that when considering the evidence as a whole,
the anecdotal evidence contributed to the finding that race had been a significant factor
in the peremptory jury strikes).
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court to be examples of racially motivated implicit bias.'" While similar
case law may not be conclusive as to establish a relevant pattern of
discrimination, anecdotal evidence could be used to support Golphin's
claim similar to the way Robinson utilized anecdotal evidence.' 6 5
This practical evidence is important because it supports the notion that
implicit bias is present in jury selection in North Carolina.'66
Independently, a few isolated case studies would not be enough proof to
convince the court that race had been a significant factor in the strikes, but
taken together with the statistics, the court is likely to be more convinced
that implicit bias persists.' 6 7 Furthermore, in an inquiry only considering
explicit bias, it is unlikely that this anecdotal evidence would be allowed
into court since it has no relevance to the prosecutor's isolated intent in
Golphin.168
2. Under a Narrow Interpretationof the 2012 Amendment, Golphin Will
Not Be GrantedReliefBecause an IntentionalDiscriminationRequirement
Createsa Burden Equivalent to the Batson Challenge That Ignores Implicit
Bias.

If a narrow interpretation of the 2012 Amendment is applied, Golphin
must prove intentional discrimination in his individual case.',6 If Golphin
is affirmed under this standard, relief will be denied since it is unlikely that
Golphin will be able to prove the prosecutor intentionally struck two jurors
because of their race.170
The Robinson court recognized that if an intentional discrimination
164. See id. at 134 (stating that one of the experts during the trial discussed a
practice known as targeting where jurors are asked different voir dire questions,
sometimes based on race); id. at n.18 ("While the Supreme Court upheld the trial
court's overruling of the Batson challenge in Golphin, this Court may consider the facts
and circumstances of Murray's voir dire as evidence supporting an RJA claim.").
165. See id. at 163 (noting that the Court utilized all relevant evidence, from
historical to anecdotal to statistical, in coming to its decision that North Carolina
prosecutors were culpable for a history of racially motivated jury strikes).
166. See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-2011 (West 2011) (allowing for both
practical and statistical evidence to be used to make a showing that race was a
significant factor under the statute).
167. See, e.g., Robinson, No. 91 CRS 23143, slip op. at 163-64 (considering the
totality of the evidence, including witnesses; affidavits; and anecdotal, historical, and
statistical evidence, and concluding by a preponderance of the evidence that race was a
significant factor in the jury selection of Robinson's trial).
168. See, e.g., Golphin II, 519 F.3d 168, 181 (4th Cir. 2008) (incorporating no
discussion of other similar case law in North Carolina that exhibited acts of implicit
bias injury selection).
169. See Act of July 2, 2012, 2012 N.C. Sess. Laws 136, sec. 3, § 15A-2011 (2012)
(requiring defense counsel to prove the prosecutor intended to strike the juror based on
race).
170. See Golphin I, 533 S.E.2d 168, 218-19 (N.C. 2000) (showing great deference to
the trial court's Batson analysis).
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requirement was added to the 2009 Racial Justice Act, the statute would
essentially become a recapitulation of Batson and McCleskey, both of
which require proof of intentional discrimination.171 The court specified in
Robinson that the legislature would not have created a law like the Racial
Justice Act if it did not announce a new principle of law.172 By requiring
Golphin to prove discrimination in his individual case, the 2012
Amendment only considers the explicit racial bias exhibited by the
prosecutor under the narrow interpretation.' 73 This is the same inquiry that
occurs in a Batson challenge. 174
Unfortunately, the Batson test was already applied to Golphin's case
when the peremptory strikes occurred and when an appellate court
subsequently reviewed the case.175 The court accepted the prosecutor's
race-neutral reasons for striking the black jurors, which included demeanor,
age, and familial relations.176
Because the inquiry was only allowed to encompass the intentional acts
of the prosecutor, defense counsel was limited in the strategy and evidence
it could provide to challenge the peremptory strikes.177 First, defense
counsel contended that the prosecutor's strikes were pretextual by arguing
that similarly situated white jurors were seated on the jury.'" 8 These
171. See Robinson, No. 91 CRS 23143, slip op. at 36 (using the Rule Against
Surplusage method of statutory interpretation to determine that legislatures generally
do not pass laws that will not have any new substantial effect).
172. See id (recognizing that were the court to interpret the 2009 Racial Justice Act
as including an evidence of intent requirement, it would have the same intent
requirement as previous Supreme Court case law).
173. See Act of July 2, 2012, 2012 N.C. Sess. Laws 136, sec. 3, § 15A-201 1(a)
(2012) (returning the state of the law to the same burden that existed before the 2009
Racial Justice Act was passed).
174. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 82 (1986) (creating a burden that falls on
defense counsel to prove discrimination rather than allowing for a broad inquiry into
state practices).
175. See id. (failing to find that the peremptory strikes were motivated by race);
Golphin II, 519 F.3d 168, 188 (4th Cir. 2008) (affirming the denial of habeas corpus by
the district court and thereby refusing to recognize the pretextual nature of the
peremptory strikes).
176. See Golphin 1, 533 S.E.2d 168, 212 (N.C. 2000) (reciting the trial transcript
during jury selection which includes statements by the prosecutor speculating that
Holder was shy when she was unresponsive to his attempts to engage her in more than
simple answers); see also id. at 213 (recounting trial transcripts where the prosecutor
complained that Murray gave short answers to some questions while elaborating his
answers to other questions).
177. See Golphin II, 519 F.3d at 183 (identifying that despite the disproportionate
number of strikes of black jurors, the trial court appropriately weighed the evidence in
deciding the Batson challenge).
178. Compare Robinson v. North Carolina, No. 91 CRS 23143, slip op. at 143 (N.C.
Super. Ct. Apr. 20, 2012) (finding that in Cumberland County when white jurors and
black jurors had similar characteristics, white jurors were seated whereas black jurors
were struck), with Golphin II, 519 F.3d at 181-82 (refusing to find disparate treatment
even after recognizing differential treatment between white and black jurors in jury
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examples were not convincing enough for the court to find that explicit bias
played a role in the strikes.' 7 9 Next, defense counsel highlighted examples
of similarly situated black and white jurors being questioned differently
about their family members' criminal records, a factor that ultimately
became a race-neutral reason proffered for striking one black juror.'80
Despite the inconsistent questioning from the prosecutor, the court still
refused to find that explicit bias fueled the strike.' 8' Finally, the prosecutor
articulated one black juror's demeanor, including his wearing a gold
earring and giving answers filled with militant animus, as one of the raceneutral reasons for striking him.' 82 Although the trial court judge openly
disagreed with the prosecutor, stating that the juror's demeanor had been
thoughtful and entirely appropriate, the judge failed to inquire further into
the prosecutor's intentions for striking the black juror.' 8 3
While on the surface these may seem like reasonable race-neutral
reasons for a peremptory strike, they have nothing to do with whether the
jurors would be able to follow the law or impose the death penalty.' 8 4 The
Batson test, however, does not call for any reasonableness standard to
apply to the race-neutral reasons given by a prosecutor for striking a
potential jury member. 85 As long as the prosecutor offers any reason not
tied to race, the strike will stand as it has previously in Golphin.186 With
such a limited scope of inquiry into the bias that occurred during Golphin's
jury selection, it is unlikely that an appeal will affirm intentional

selection).
179. See Golphin II, 519 F.3d at 182 (allowing for Murray to be struck from the jury
in part for his prior DUI conviction when two other white jurors also had previous
convictions, one of which was a DWI).
180. See id. at 182-83 (permitting a white juror, Virginia Broderick, to remain seated
on the jury after the prosecution questioned her further about her involvement with
family members who had numerous drug convictions).
181. See id. at 182 (accepting the strike against Murray in part because his father
had been convicted of a robbery years earlier, even though he did not remain in contact
with his father and it would not have affected his ability to remain impartial during the
case).
182. See id at 181-82 (questioning the deference of Murray since he gave both
elaborate and short answers to the court).
183. See id. at 182 (reprimanding the prosecutor and declining to include the juror's
demeanor as a reason for the strike).
184. See id. (reprimanding the prosecutor for contending that the jurors were acting
less than deferential to the court when they failed to elaborate on their answers to
simple yes or no questions).
185. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97 (1986) (noting that the prosecutor
need only offer any explanation not tied to the race of the juror for the strike).
186. Cf Robinson v. North Carolina, No. 91 CRS 23143, slip op. at 132 (N.C.
Super. Ct. Apr. 20, 2012) (detailing past cases where peremptory strikes were passed
by the court but exhibited implicit bias because of the nature of the questioning target
groups with traditionally black membership).
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discrimination under a narrow interpretation of the 2012 Amendment. 87
IV. SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: JUDGE WEEKS'S BROAD INTERPRETATION OF
THE 2012 AMENDMENT IN NORTH CAROLINA V. GOLPHIN

On December 13, 2012, the Cumberland County Superior Court handed
down an opinion consolidating three cases, all interpreting the 2012
Amendment as a matter of first impression.' 88 The court found race to be a
significant factor in the prosecution's peremptory strikes in all three
instances.' 89 The court held that Golphin proved that race was a significant
factor in prosecutorial peremptory strikes and decisions to seek the death
penalty in his case and in Cumberland County.190 For the court to properly
decide the case, it was first required to interpret the new 2012 Amendment
to the Racial Justice Act.' 9'
A. JudicialDivision and Statewide StatisticsAre PermissibleEvidence.

A significant change in the 2012 Amendment was the temporal and
geographical restrictions on statistics relied on for a defendant to prevail on
a claim.192 While this stringent language suggested that statistics falling
outside these parameters would not be permissible evidence, the court took
a different stance.' 93 The court cited the statute's broad language as one
justification for allowing statistical evidence that fell outside the
enumerated parameters to be considered.194 This notion was supported by
basic evidentiary principles specifying that relevant evidence, both direct
and circumstantial, should be admitted.19 5
187. See Golphin II, 519 F.3d at 186 (declining to adopt defense counsel's argument

that a comparison between Holder and Murray and similarly situated white jurors who
were passed by the prosecution displayed a pretextual undertone).
188. See Golphin III, No. 97 CRS 47314-15 (N.C. Super. Ct. Dec. 13, 2012)
(considering whether the death sentences of Tilmon Golphin, Christina Walters, and
Quintel Augustine were sought or obtained on the basis of race).
189. See id. at 208, 210 (asserting that all three defendants had met their burden
under both the 2009 Racial Justice Act and the 2012 Amendment).
190. See id. at 207 (finding that although not required under either statute, Golphin
proved that the prosecution's peremptory strikes were intentional).
191. Id. at 9.
192. See Act of July 2, 2012, 2012 N.C. Sess. Laws 136, sec. 3, § 15A-2011 (a),
(d) (2012) (establishing a time frame of permissible statistics as "from [ten] years prior
to the commission of the offense to the date that is two years after the imposition of
the death sentence" and specifying the county and prosecutorial district as the
appropriate geographical measure).
193. Golphin III, No. 97 CRS 47314-15, slip op. at 14.
194. See id. at 13 (noting that section 15A-201 1 (d) states that "other evidence" may
be used to establish that race was used as a significant factor in decision to seek or
impose a death sentence).
195. See id.(defining relevant evidence as "evidence having any tendency to prove a
fact at issue").
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The court noted that statistical evidence falling outside the enumerated
provisions would constitute circumstantial "other evidence" that should be
admitted because it would tend to prove that discrimination occurred in
Golphin's individual case.196 The MSU Study used in Robinsonl9 7 was
therefore admissible as circumstantial evidence in Golphin.'98 In addition
to the statewide data discussed at length in Robinson, the court also
examined unadjusted data from the same experts regarding the Second
judicial division, Cumberland County, and Golphin's individual trial.199
The results of the study established that blacks of the Second judicial
division were struck at a rate of 51.5%, while whites were struck at a rate
of 25.1 %.200 Additionally, the study recognized that in Cumberland
County blacks were struck at a rate of 52.7%, contrasted with a 20.5% rate
for all other jurors. 20 1 Finally, the study listed the strike rate ratio in
Golphin's own trial as 2.0.202
Two regression analyses also supported the unadjusted data conclusions
that the strikes of black jury members in Golphin's trial were statistically
significant.203 The first regression produced a statistically significant strike
rate ratio of 2.1 1.204 The second strike rate ratio of 2.09 was also deemed
statistically significant.205
This court's interpretation of the 2012 Amendment will aid future
defendants, as it did Golphin, in establishing that race was a significant
factor in the decision to seek or impose the death penalty.20 6 Unfortunately,
the 2012 Amendment does not go so far as to grant relief based only on
196. See id at 14 (holding that the additional statistical information is helpful to the
court in reaching its determination and also recognizing that the Reference Manual on
Scientific Evidence supports using additional studies when possible to support a
conclusion).
197. See generally supra Part II.D..
198. See Golphin III, No. 97 CRS 47314-15, slip op. at 200-01 (finding the
statewide data to be indicative of the prosecution's peremptory strike patterns in North
Carolina in the designated time period); see also id. at 188 (detailing the statistical
significance of the MSU Study as applied to Golphin).
199. See id. at 158-61.
200. See id. at 159 (reflecting a strike rate ratio of 2.05).
201. See id (underscoring that with a strike rate ratio of 2.57, Cumberland County
has a higher strike rate for blacks than the state average of 2.05).
202. See id at 162 (detailing further the strike rates for the statutory time frame as
increasing when the study employs a smoothing analysis to give a more accurate
indication of strike rates).
203. See id at 175-76.
204. See id. at 176 (adjusting the data by screening for appropriate control variables
which ultimately mirrored the Cumberland County analysis).
205. See id. (refining the analysis by using data only from the appropriate statutory
time frame for Golphin's case).
206. See id. at 164 (highlighting the advantage of using all data within the study to
prove the prima facie case of discrimination).
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statistics. 2 07 The 2009 Racial Justice Act remains the paramount alternative
to ferreting out implicit bias by allowing relief to be granted on statistical
evidence alone.208
B. The LegislatureDid Not Intend to Include a Case-Specific Intent
Requirement.
Though the 2012 Amendment employs the terminology "in the
defendant's case" in several instances, the court did not read this language
as a requirement that the defendant prove that intentional discrimination
occurred within his or her individual trial.209 Instead, the Golphin court
concluded that "in the defendant's case" is a mere reflection of the
temporal and geographic constraints that are original to the 2012
Amendment. 2 10 The court noted the different contexts of the legislature's
use of "in the defendant's case" as support for its finding. 211 The court
focused first on the legislature's choice of using "may" in the clause that
establishes what types of proof may be offered to establish race as a
significant factor.212 This choice, the court reasoned, reflects the intention
of the legislature for defendants to be able to prove their cases using either
evidence from their own cases or other types of evidence. 2 13 Additionally,
the court noted that legislature omitted the "in the defendant's case"
language in the key portion of the statute dictating the standard for the
burden of proof.2 14 Finally, although the 2012 Amendment constrained the
breadth of admissible statistics, the legislature's concentration on the
statutory time frame, as well as the county and prosecutorial district,
suggests that it intended for the court to be able to consider evidence
outside of the defendant's individual case.215 Without an explicit statement
from the legislature for courts only to consider evidence of intentional
discrimination from the defendant's case, the remaining language of the
2012 Amendment suggests that no proof of trial-specific discrimination is

207. Act of July 2, 2012, 2012 N.C. Sess. Laws 136, sec. 3, § 15A-201 1(e) (2012).
208. See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-2012 (West 2011) (delineating no prohibition
on granting relief based entirely on statistical findings).
209. See Golphin III, No. 97 CRS 47314-15, slip op. at 17 (acknowledging that the
word "trial" does not appear anywhere in the 2012 Amendment to indicate that proof of
case-specific discrimination is required).
210. See id. (distinguishing the significance of the phrase by noting its absence in
the 2009 Racial Justice Act).
211. See id. at 16 (reasoning that if this phrase carried the same meaning in all
contexts of the statute, the additional language would carry no independent meaning).
212. See id. at 17-18 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-201 1(a) (West 2011)).
213. Id. at 18.
214. Id. at 17.
215. Id. at 18.
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necessary.216
C. The 2012 Amendment Is Not Retroactive.

Important to Golphin was whether the court would interpret the 2012
Amendment to be retroactive. 217
2 The 2012 Amendment does not explicitly
state that it applies retroactively.2 18 Therefore, the court employed a fourpart analysis to consider legislative intent, constitutional issues, equitable
considerations, and arbitrariness. 21 9 The court explained that it is required
to recognize the 2012 Amendment as prospective, noting that the word
"retroactive" does not appear anywhere in the statute.220 Numerous
references were made to the 2009 statute, yet at no point did the legislature
indicate that the 2012 Amendment should be applied to previously filed
claims. 2 2 1 Finally, the stated intent of the legislature, to provide
"amelioration of the death sentence," obliged the court to allow previously
filed claims to proceed under both versions of the Racial Justice Act. 22 2
The Court also concluded that the 2012 Amendment could not be applied
retroactively if Golphin's constitutional rights had vested in his claim under
the 2009 Racial Justice Act. 22 3 Since the 2009 Racial Justice Act mandates
that a hearing be scheduled when a defendant files a proper claim under the
statute, Golphin's right to a hearing under the 2009 Racial Justice Act
vested when he filed his particularized claim. 2 24 Therefore, applying the
2012 Amendment retroactively would destroy Golphin's vested
constitutional right to a hearing under the 2009 Racial Justice Act.225
Equitable considerations also suggest that the 2012 Amendment should

216. Id at 17 (leveling the playing field for future defendants who otherwise would
have been faced with an insurmountable burden of proof).
217. See id. at 32 (indicating that the Golphin, Walters, and Augustine all filed their
claims under both the 2009 Racial Justice Act and the 2012 Amendment).
218. See generally Act of July 2, 2012, 2012 N.C. Sess. Laws 136, sec. 3, § 15A2011 (2012).
219. Golphin III, No. 97 CRS 47314-15, slip op. at 32.
220. See id. at 34-35 (referencing a statute passed by the state legislature stating,
"There is always a presumption that statutes are intended to operate prospectively
only... .").
221. See id. at 33 (noticing that the legislature failed to specify whether the 2009
Racial Justice Act should be applied in conjunction with or in place of the 2012
Amendment for previously filed claims).
222. See id. at 33-34 (explaining that case law dictates an ameliorative law to
entertain claims under the most expansive law for granting a defendant relief (citing
Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 294 (1977))).
223. See id. at 36 (stating that vesting has occurred "at the time of the injury that
gives rise to the cause of action").
224. See id. at 40 (acknowledging that Golphin's claim was filed within the statutory
deadline).
225. Id. at 41.
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not be applied retroactively. 226 In reviewing the procedural history of
Golphin's claim under the 2009 Racial Justice Act, the court found
numerous delays in both Robinson and in Golphin's proceedings that were
the result of the prosecution's incessant requests for continuance. 227 Also
considered along with the equitable concerns was the constitutional
principle of arbitrariness.228 The court took notice of the State's collective
actions: once Robinson was handed down, the prosecution worked closely
with the legislature to ensure that future defendants would not be able to
secure relief under the 2009 Racial Justice Act.229 Since Golphin's claim
was filed properly under the 2009 Racial Justice Act, and application of the
2012 Amendment would produce arbitrary results, both equitable principles
and arbitrariness in addition to legislative intent and constitutional issues
weighed against applying the 2012 Amendment retroactively. 230
D. The Court Explicitly Addresses Implicit Bias.

In addition to interpreting the 2012 Amendment in a manner most
favorable to proving implicit bias, the court explicitly addressed the
testimony provided on implicit bias. 231' The court first acknowledged
Professor Stevenson's testimony regarding the historical discrimination
blacks have experienced in both the United States and in North Carolina.23 2
Stevenson explained that one common response to civil rights legislation
was to increase the number of peremptory strikes available to the
prosecution to ensure blacks were kept off juries.233 Stevenson additionally
explained the circular logic that results in the prosecution's peremptory
strikes of black jurors; prosecutors often feel that blacks perceive the police
authority in a negative light due to past discrimination. 23 4 Applying this
226. Id. at 43.
227. See id at 42-43 (noting that if the court had not granted the prosecution's

copious requests for continuance, Robinson would have been decided as much as five
months earlier and Golphin's hearing would have taken place before the 2012
Amendment was passed by the legislature).
228. Id. at 43.
229. See id. at 44 ("In Robinson, this Court found precisely this insidious form of
discrimination in cases throughout North Carolina between 1990 and 2010. Instead of
confronting these findings with concern however, in July 2012, the legislature
attempted to ignore them by enacting the amended [Racial Justice Act], which
extinguishes at least some capital defendants' ability to pursue statewide claims.").
230. Id. at 45.
231. See id. at 87 (outlining the testimony of experts Stevenson, Trosch, and

Sommers).

232. See id. at 88 (noting that some of the earliest civil rights efforts for blacks to be
able to serve on juries resulted in violence like the Wilmington riots).
233. See id. (detailing that in capital cases in North Carolina, peremptory strikes
increased from six to nine in 1971, and again to fourteen in 1977).
234. See id. at 90 (explaining that prosecutors strike blacks for what they believe is a
race-neutral reason-that blacks will not convict, especially in capital cases, because of
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social science conclusion to Golphin, the court concluded that unconscious
bias did play a role in the prosecutor's strikes in Cumberland County.235
The court continued its discussion focusing on the evidence presented by
the defense in experts Trosch's and Sommers' testimony.236 Judge Trosch
addressed the process of decision-making and the interplay of unconscious
bias, emphasizing the danger of this process occurring in the courtroom.237
He quoted studies demonstrating that people tend to make gut decisions
and rationalize those decisions later, dismissing any conclusions that do not
fit into their original preconceived- notions. 238
Professor Sommers educated the court on his own study, where he tested
the influence of unconscious bias on peremptory strikes, and found
significant racial disparities.239 In light of the studies presented, the court
noted the opportunity for unconscious bias to become prevalent in
emotionally charged capital cases such as Golphin's. 2 40 The court
concluded that there was ample opportunity for unconscious bias to play a
role in the Cumberland County cases, quoting the prosecutor's own
testimony that he used a "gut feel" to determine peremptory strikes.24'
Social science undoubtedly played a pivotal role in the court's conclusion
that implicit bias has no place in jury selection. 24 2
V. POLICY RECOMMENDATION
Both explicit bias and implicit bias can have a monumental effect on the
outcome of a defendant's sentence.243 Whether a peremptory strike used
against a black juror is motivated by explicit or implicit bias, the result is
the same: a miscarriage of justice done to both the defendant and the
community.244 While the process and consequences of explicit bias are
their distrust of authority).
235. See id at 91 (asserting that this bias cloaked in reason is an unacceptable
practice of discrimination that must cease).
236. Id. at 92.
237. Id. (explaining that the quick pace of decision making in the courtroom
enhances the likelihood of implicit bias coming into play undetected).
238. Id. (cautioning that in addition to the unsteady process, research shows that
people tend to be overconfident in their own decision-making and resistant to the
notion of error rates).
239. See id. at 93 (using graduate students and lawyers in a controlled setting).
240. See id (noting the competitive nature and pressure for prosecutors to secure
convictions in death penalty cases).
241. See id. at 94-95 (noting the particular motivations in Golphin's trial to secure a
jury most sympathetic to a law enforcement victim).
242. See id. at 95.
243. See, e.g., Golphin II, 519 F.3d 168, 182 (4th Cir. 2008) (upholding the
defendant's death sentence because no statute existed to provide relief from implicit
bias during jury selection).
244. Cf Robinson v. North Carolina, No. 91 CRS 23143, slip op. at 166-67 (N.C.
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generally known, experts are now investigating implicit bias and have
begun testing its effects in the courtroom.2 45 Currently, these experts
recommend educating judges and jurors about implicit biaS24 6 and
controlling the decision-making environment to decrease the effects of
247
implicit bias in the courtroom.
Since the person exhibiting bias cannot detect the implicit bias, states
should also consider implementing a mechanism to constantly evaluate the
presence of implicit bias in jury selection. An ongoing study similar to the
MSU Study would allow for a record to be kept on file so that prosecutors,
defense counsel, and judges could constantly review their performance.248
If attorneys are able to continuously evaluate their peremptory strike
behavior, they will become more conscious of patterns that may indicate
that implicit bias is influencing a strike. 24 9
Beyond these suggestions, state legislatures have the opportunity to
make an impact by passing racial justice statutes. 250 States should carefully
craft legislation to ensure that their statutes recognize both explicit and
implicit biases.2 5 ' This should include allowing for unrestricted use of
statistics by both defense counsel and the prosecution.252 A successful
statute will also allow for relief to be granted absent a showing of
intentional discrimination in the individual case.253 Allowing race to

Super. Ct. Apr. 20, 2012) (correcting the injustice that kept Robinson on death row for
over a decade).
245. See Smith & Levinson, supra note 30, at 826 (acknowledging that a blanket
solution to curb implicit bias may never exist).
246. See generally Kang et al., supra note 13, at 1182-83 (recommending that jurors
take a pledge against involving implicit bias in their decision making to create an
awareness in the courtroom).
247. See generally id. at 1169-72 (suggesting that both judges and juries be exposed
to counter-typical representations of blacks and whites to begin to break down
subconscious stereotypes and to also allot more time for decision-making).
248. See Robinson, No. 91 CRS 23143, slip op. at 62-64 (tracking the number of
cases, number of black jurors, number of white jurors, and the strike ratio for each
capital trial).
249. See Kang et al., supra note 13, at 1179 (encouraging judges to count to keep
track of their rulings that may involve implicit bias to deter bias influencing future
decisions).
250. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-2010 (West 2011) (mandating that no
person shall be subject to a death sentence imposed on the basis of race).
251. Cf Act of July 2, 2012, 2012 N.C. Sess. Laws 136, sec. 3, § 15A-2011 (2012)
(amending the statute to alter the required standards of proof so as to only grant relief
upon a showing of explicit racial bias).
252. See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-2010 (West 2011) (including statistical proof
as valid evidence to show that implicit bias can be the cause of racial discrimination in
peremptory strikes).
253. See id. (granting relief based on a showing of disparate impact or
discrimination in the relevant jurisdiction over time and thus recognizing the presence
of implicit bias and the difficulty in detecting such).
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motivate any part of the capital punishment process is unacceptable.
Therefore, it is imperative that state legislatures create laws that have the
capacity to combat both forms of bias.255
VI. CONCLUSION

After applying both the 2009 Racial Justice Act and a narrow
interpretation of the 2012 Amendment to Golphin, it becomes clear that
Golphin would only receive relief under the 2009 Racial Justice Act for the
same discriminatory peremptory strikes.25 6 The 2009 Racial Justice Act
has the capacity to uncover both explicit and implicit racial bias in jury
selection, whereas a narrow interpretation of the 2012 Amendment only
addresses explicit racial bias.257 Even under Judge Weeks's broad
interpretation of the 2012 Amendment, implicit bias considerations only
play a limited role in exposing discrimination.25 8 Since both forms of racial
bias have an equally devastating effect on the imposition of capital
punishment, it would be an arbitrary application of capital punishment to
provide for a statute that addresses one but not both forms of bias. 2 59 The
2012 Amendment, therefore, should be repealed, and the legislature should
adopt the previous version of the statute implemented in 2009.260

254. See, e.g., id. § 15A-2010 (refusing to allow capital punishment to be carried out
when it was obtained on the basis of race).
255. Cf Act of July 2, 2012, 2012 N.C. Sess. Laws 136, sec. 3, § 15A-2011 (2012)
(continuing the miscarriage of justice in North Carolina by repealing the elements of
the 2009 Act that accounted for implicit racial bias).
256. See id. sec. 3, § 15A-2012 (providing relief to parties who prove that race was a
significant factor in a decision to seek or impose the death penalty).
257. See, e.g., Robinson v. North Carolina, No. 91 CRS 23143, slip op. at 166-67
(N.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 20, 2012) (ordering relief when Robinson successfully proved
that race was a significant factor in the peremptory strikes that occurred during his
trial).
258. See Golphin III, No. 97 CRS 47314-15, slip op. at 97 (N.C. Super. Ct. Dec. 13,
2012).
259. See generally U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (mandating that no person should be
subject to Cruel and Unusual punishment, which has been interpreted to include
arbitrary punishments invoked against racial groups for membership in that group).
260. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN § 15A-2011 (West 2011) (providing relief for
implicit bias), with Act of July 2, 2012, 2012 N.C. Sess. Laws 136, sec. 3, § 15A2011(d)-(e) (2012) (providing relief only for acts of explicit discrimination).
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